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NotEs AN CoMNTs
the principles of law heretofore thought applicable to these cases
will no longer be controlling. It was there said that:
"... a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed ... The
principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously
negligible .... or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary
... .Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on
activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate."
This language would seem to indicate that future tax statutes will
be held constitutional regardless of their regulatory effect, even though
the revenue purpose is merely secondary, provided the statute is
labelled a tax. Although it is true that the actual decision of the
case was much narrower than the opinion indicates, it should at least
show that the present trend is to extend the use of the taxing power
as a regulatory device, and that the Supreme Court is not yet ready to
draw the line which must undoubtedly exist if the taxing power of
congress under the Federal Constitution is not to be used to destroy the
federal system.*
Joam K. LEOPARD
FAILURE TO MENTION AFTERBORN CHILDREN IN WILL
MADE WHILE WIFE IS PREGNANT AS SHOWING
INTENT TO DISINHERIT
Most civilized nations give a person the privilege of disposing of
his property by will. In Anglo-American countries this freedom of
testation is permitted with fewer restrictions than in civil law coun-
tries.' For example, in the continental countries, regardless of the
wishes of the testator, the children, spouse, and parents take forced
shares of which they usually cannot be deprived.2 But in England and
America, the survivors are not so protected and may generally be dis-
inherited by the decedent.3
There are statutes in the United States, however, designed to
prevent under some circumstances, unintentional disinheritance of
children not mentioned in a will. In six states statutes declare that
wills made during marriage are revoked by the birth of issue there-
-'Id. at 44.
Since this note was written the Bookie Tax has been upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States in United States v. Karhfiger, 78 S. Ct. 510 (March 9,
1953).
5 ATmNSON, WiLs 95 (1987).
2 Id. at 8.
"Ibid.
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after.4 In most jurisdictions the statutes do not provide for revocation,"
but instead provide that a child born after the making of a will may
take his intestate share of the estate regardless of the will.6 The policy
supporting these statutes is the prevention of unintentional or inad-
vertent disinheritance or as has been stated, "to guard and provide
against such testamentary thoughtlessness and lack of vision as prevent
a testator from contemplating the possibility of afterborn children and
taking such possibility into account in framing a scheme for the testa-
mentary disposition of his property."7
The typical situation giving rise to the operation of the so-called
pretermitted child statutes arises where a testator executes a valid will
and subsequent to its execution his wife gives birth to issue which are
unprovided for in the will. Under a majority of statutes the after
born child inherits that portion of the testators estate, both real and
personal, that he would have taken had his parent died intestate.8
This share is generally provided by means of contribution among
those who inherit under the will.
Usually these statutes clearly set out the situations in which after-
born children are not to be protected. In all American jurisdictions
the testator may avoid operation of the statutes by expressly providing
in his will for any afterborn children. In over half the states a settle-
ment outside the will is sufficient to prevent the afterborn child from
taking his intestate share. Also, in most states, an express statement
in the will of an intent to disinherit the afterborn child will be equally
effective. 9
In Kentucky, as in other states, the effect of the statute in favor of
afterborn children' 9 can be avoided by providing for them in the will,"
or by an express statement that they shall take nothing,'2 as well as by
a settlement outside the will during the testator's lifetime.'3
If a testator fails to provide for an afterborn child in his will and
at the same time does not expressly disinherit it, an ambiguity arises
'2 CoNN. GENY. STAT. c. 341, sec. 6956 (1949); GA. CODE see. 113-408 (Park,
1933); 3 IND. STAT. ANN. sec. 7-303 (Bums, 1933); KANs. GCEr. STAT. ANN. sec.
50-610 (1949); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1705 (Dart, 1945); 1 N. J. REV. STAT.
see. 3:2-15 (1937).
'ATm nsoN, WmLs 95 (1937).
'Robert E. Mathews, Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of Statutes, 29 CoL. L.
REv. 748 et seq. (1929).
'McLean v. McLean, 207 N. Y. 365, 371, 101 N.E. 178, 179 (1913).
'Mathews, supra, note 6, at 749.
Old. at 72.
'Ky. Rxv. STAT. sec. 394.380 (1948).
Porter v. Porter's Ex'r., 120 Ky. 302, 86 S.W. 546 (1905).
Logan v. Bean's Admr., 120 Ky. 712, 87 S.W. 1110 (1905).
See provisions of Ky. REx. STAT. sec. 394.380 (1948).
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with respect to the testators intention. By his failure to provide for
the child it can be said that the testator intends to disinherit him. On
the other hand, it can just as well be argued that failure to expressly
disinherit the child shows an intention not to do so. This ambiguity
has been resolved by the above mentioned statutes in favor of the
afterborn child. The presumption under these statutes is that failure
to mention afterborn children is by oversight or inadvertence because
of the failure of the parent in not providing for a contingent situation.14
This presumption can be overcome if it can be shown that the failure
to mention the child was not pure oversight, but was the result of an
actual intent for such after born children not to inherit. The question
then arises as to how the intent of the testator to disinherit the child
can be shown, other than by express exclusion in the will, so as to
avoid operation of the statute. The answer lies in the use of extrinsic
evidence to show the testators intent.' 5
Extrinsic evidence that may show the testator's intent to disinherit
is the pregnancy of the testator's wife at the time of the execution of
the will coupled with a failure to make a provision for that child. It is
submitted that in this situation an intent to disinherit the child is mani-
fested even though the testator does not expressly so sate in his will.
As an illustration, testator executes his will on October 1, in which he
leaves all his property to his wife, remainder at her -death to his
brother. On November 1, of that year, testator's wife gave birth to a
child. By implication, that child is disinherited. This is true even
though the testator did not expressly disinherit the child in the will.
The validity of this argument is not hampered by the policy behind
the pretermitted child statutes already mentioned which is to protect
afterborn children from unintentional or inadevertent disinheritance.
It is easy to understand that in executing a will a testator may not
foresee a child being born two years hence; but can it be said that he
omits to provide for a child because of lack of vision or by inadvert-
ence, when he knows his wife is presently pregnant?
Christian v. Carter, 193 N.C. 537, 137 S.E. 596 (1927).
'The decisions are not in accord as to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence
to show whether or not the omission of a testator to provide for his child was in-
tentional, thereby avoiding the application of the pretermission statute. This lack
of accord is due in part . . . to the difference in terminology of the various
statutes.
"It would appear that under the maiority of the pretermission statutes
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show whether the testator intended to omit
provisions for his child or children." 170 A.L.R. 1379 (1947).
For a more extended discussion of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to
show a testator's intention as to omission or disinheritance of children, see the
annotation in 94 A.L.R. 209 et seq. (1935).
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In the Illinois case of Hedlund v. Miner,16 the court evidently
failed to look to the underlying policy behind the pretermitted child
statutes when it did not find an intention to disinherit in such a situa-
tion. There, the testator, who had no children, but was shortly ex-
pecting the birth of a child, executed a will in which he devised all
his estate to his wife. One month later, a daughter was born to him.
After the testator died the child was held entitled to an interest in
his estate. The appellant, in an attempt to avoid the statute,17 con-
tended that the testator gave all of his property to his wife, well know-
ing of the pregnancy when he executed his will and that this mani-
fested "his intention to disinherit his child about to be born and ex-
clude it from receiving any portion of his estate."' However, the court
did not approve of this contention.
In other cases it has been held that the failure of the testator to
mention the child with which his wife is pregnant is not indicative of
an intent to disinherit that child and thus an application of the pre-
termitted child statute is not avoided. The theory followed in many of
these cases is that the clear and unambiguous terms of the statute are
not affected by the existence of the condition of pregnancy.20
There are cases, however, where the single fact of pregnancy
coupled with omission to mention the child has been held to be suf-
ficient to show an intention to disinherit. Thus, in an early Massa-
chusetts case,21 the testatrix gave birth to a child one month after
she executed her will in which she devised all her property to her
husband. The child sought his portion of the mother's estate under
the pretermitted child statute then in force. 22 The court held that the
failure to mention the child was an intentional disinheritance. Finding
this intention from the single fact of pregnancy when the will was
executed, the court said:
"There is nothing in this will, except the fact of the omission, which
indicates a purpose not to provide for her son. But the relation of
the testatrix to the objects of her bounty and to the child for whom
provision is omitted, as well as her intelligence, and the circumstances
under which the will is made, are all proper matters for considera-
tion.... The judge might well find that the fact that the testatrix
was so soon to be delivered of her first child must have been in her
mind when the will was made, and could not have been forgotten.
- 395 Ill. 217, 69 N.E. 2d 862 (1946).
" ILL. REV. STAT. c. 3, sec. 199 (1945).
Supra note 16 at -, N.E. at 867.
"McCrum v. McCrum, 141 App. Div. 83, 125 N.Y.S. 717 (1910).
McCrum v. McCrum, 141 App. Div. 83, 125 N.Y. S. 717 (1910); see also
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Wasserman, 22 F. 872 (1885).
'Peters v. Siders, 126 Mass. 135 (1879).
'MAss. GEN. STAT, c. 92, sec. 25 (1932).
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There is no suggestion of any mistake of fact or law, or any ignorance
on the part of the testatrix, or any oversight of the scribe, as the
cause of the omission. '
In a similar situation the Tennessee court 24 held that the child was
disinherited by "unavoidable inference" or by "necessary implication",
by construing the will in the light of "existing facts and surrounding
circumstances," namely, the fact that the testatrix was pregnant when
she executed her will.
2 5
There is another line of cases in accord with the cases just dis-
cussed, however, they contain the additional factor that when the
testator executed his will, he not only failed to provide for a child
with which the wife was then pregnant, but also omitted mentioning
his children then living. The fact that the living child is not provided
for strengthens the case for finding "from all the facts and circum-
stances" when the will is executed, an intention to disinherit the after
born child.
In the Kentucky case of Leonard v. Enochs 6 the testator willed his
estate to his wife. At the time he executed his will he had one child
living and his wife was pregnant with another child. This daughter,
born two months after testator's death, later claimed her intestate
share of her father's estate under the pretermitted child statute in
Kentucky.27 The testator in his will had never expressly stated that
the child should not take and yet the court refused to apply the statute
for her benefit. The court found an intention to exclude the claimant
by virtue of the fact that the testator did not bequeath or devise any
property to his then living child. The court stated:
"It makes no difference in what form such intention may be ex-
pressed in the will; it may be by direct words of exclusion or it may
be plainly seen from the whole will that the testator intended to
exclude the afterborn child, and if thus seen it is 'expressly excluded
by the will'. Does such intention appear from the will? We think it
does .... Now, as said, the living child not having been expressly
Supra note 21 at 138.
'King v. King, 166 Tenn. 115, 59 S.W. 2d 510 (1933).
S.W. at 512. Also see Reaves v. Hager, 101 Tenn. 714, 50 S.W. 760 (1899)
and Lindsley v. Lindsley, 98 R.I. 85, 197 AtI. 98 (1938), where the testator
executed his will two months and thirteen days before the expected birth of his
first child. It made no provision for children who might be born afterwards, but
left all of his property to his wife. The court stated that there is a presumption
that a testator's omission of his children from his will is accidental and not in-
tentional but that such a presumption could be rebutted. Here the presumption
was held rebutted by the evidence that the testaor expressed his intention, in
conversation with his wife, to leave all his property to her by will, when he
"knew and talked with her about the expected birth of her first child." AUt. at 99.
U 92 Ky. 186, 17 S.W. 437 (1891).
GEw. STAT. see. 25, c. 113 at the time this case was decided. It is now Ky.lEv. STAT. sec. 394.380 (1948).
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excluded by name, but clearly, expressly excluded by the content of
the will... does it not follow that the afterborn child was likewise
intentionally, expressly excluded from the provisions of the will? We
think it was."'
Thus, the Kentucky Court felt that it found an intent to disinherit
expressly stated in the will and therefore did not need to resort to
extrinsic evidence to determine the testator's intention.
An Illinois case29 puts more emphasis on the fact that the wife was
pregnant when testator executed his will. In addition to this pro-
spective child he had two living children, but gave all his property to
his wife, and made no provision or reference concerning children,
present or afterborn. This will was construed as disinheriting a son
born two months after the will's execution. The court stated that it
was not reasonable to believe that the testator intended to exclude
his two infant children, who were living with him when the will was
executed, and not at the same time exclude another child to be born
within two months thereafter. 30
A few courts have taken a contrary view. In a New York case,3 '
the testator had two children living at the time of the execution of his
will and his wife was pregnant with another child. He left all of his
property to his wife, failing to mention the children. The court held
that the afterborn children were entitled to the benefit of the statute
for pretermitted issue.32 Counsel opposing this holding tried to argue
that it was permissible to spell out of the will itself, coupled with the
fact that the testator did not make a new will upon birth of the after-
born children, an intention to leave nothing to afterborn children, as
well as to the children in being at the time he executed his will. The
court declared that this argument ".... goes down before the statutes
and the decision under it."33 However, there was a strong dissenting
opinion.
In conclusion, it is arguable that when a testator executes his will
and fails to provide for a child with which his wife is known to be
pregnant that the more correct view would be to hold the child im-
pliedly disinherited. After all, the policy behind the pretermitted child
statute is to prevent unintentional disinheritance caused by the testa-
"Supra note 26 at 188, S.W. at 438.
Hawhe v. Chicago & Western Indiana Ry. Co., 165 11M. 561, 46 N.E. 240
(1897).
' N.E. at 242. See also Fleming v. Phoenix Trust Co., 162 Tenn. 511, 39
S.W. 2d 277 (1931); Froehlich v. Minwegan, 804 M11. 462, 136 N.E. 669 (1922).
'Udell v. Stearns, 125 App. Div. 196, 109 N.Y.S. 407 (1908).
, 2 REv. STAT. (1st ed.) p. 65, pt. 2, c, tit. 1, sec. 49 as amended by c. 22,
p. 40, Laws of 1869.
, Supra note 31 at 408.
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tor's failing to foresee birth of future children.34 It is not likely that he
fails to foresee this possibility when his wife is presently pregnant,
but rather, it would be well to consider human nature and realize
that most people, while a wife is pregnant, do plan for the child's
future. Besides, it may be urged, as in the case of a will executed
without provision for living children, that the testator is in effect
providing for the children by leaving his estate to those whom he
knows will provide for the children. It has already been seen that
the pretermitted child statute is avoided if provision for the child is
made in the will.35 It also must be remembered that, in the absence of
statute,3 6 testator's living children unprovided for in the will are not
protected; it is arguable that a child about to be born should fall in the
same class.
However, it can be said that it is difficult in this situation to predict
with any degree of certainty whether or not a particular court will
imply an intent to disinherit a child so as to avoid application of the
pretermission statute of a state if a man executes his will while his
wife is pregnant and fails to provide for the child. In order to avoid
an unintended or unjust result the draftsman should take into con-
sideration the possibility of children being born after execution of the
will and should either expressly provide for the contingency of after-
born children or should expressly state that such children will not take
under the will. Only in this way can any certainty be injected into the
already complex field of determining a testators intent.
MinE S. TuroFF
Supra note 7 at 371, N.E. at 179. See also supra note 6 at 750.
Supra note 11.
rATxwNsoN, WnLs 94.
